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Abstract: 
This paper employs stochastic simulations of a small structural rational expectations model to 
investigate the consequences of the zero bound on nominal interest rates. We find that if the 
economy is subject to stochastic shocks similar in magnitude to those experienced in the U.S. 
over the 1980s and 1990s, the consequences of the zero bound are negligible for target 
inflation rates as low as 2 percent. However, the effects of the constraint are non-linear with 
respect to the inflation target and produce a quantitatively significant deterioration of the 
performance of the economy with targets between 0 and 1 percent. The variability of output 
increases significantly and that of inflation also rises somewhat. Also, we show that the 
asymmetry of the policy ineffectiveness induced by the zero bound generates a non-vertical 
long-run Phillips curve. Output falls increasingly short of potential with lower inflation 
targets.  
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 1 Introduction
There is fairly widespread consensus among macroeconomists that the primary long-term
objective of monetary policy ought to be a stable currency. Studies evaluating the costs of
inﬂation have long established the desirability of avoiding not only high but even moderate
inﬂation.1 However, there is still a serious debate on whether the optimal average rate of
inﬂation is low and positive, zero, or even moderately negative.2 A ni m p o r t a n ti s s u ei nt h i s
debate concerns the reduced ability to conduct eective countercyclical monetary policy
when inﬂation is low. As pointed out by Summers (1991), if the economy is faced with
a recession when inﬂation is zero, the monetary authority is constrained in its ability to
engineer a negative short-term real interest rate to damp the output loss. This constraint
reﬂects the fact that the nominal short-term interest rate cannot be lowered below zero|the
zero interest rate bound.3
This constraint would be of no relevance in the steady state of a non-stochastic model
economy. In an equilibrium with zero inﬂation, the short-term nominal interest rate would
always equal the equilibrium real rate. Stabilization of the economy in a stochastic environ-
ment, however, presupposes monetary control which leads to ﬂuctuations in the short-run
nominal interest rate. Under these circumstances, the non-negativity constraint on nomi-
nal interest rates may occasionally be binding and so may inﬂuence the performance of the
economy. This bound is more likely to be reached, the lower the average rate of inﬂation and
1Fischer and Modigliani (1978), Fischer (1981), and more recently Drill et al. (1990) and Fischer (1994),
provide a detailed accounting of the costs of inﬂation. An early analysis of the costs of both inﬂation and
deﬂation is due to Keynes (1923).
2The important contributions by Tobin (1965) and Friedman (1969) provided arguments in favor of
inﬂation and deﬂation, respectively. But theoretical arguments alone cannot provide a resolution. The
survey of the monetary growth literature by Orphanides and Solow (1990) suggests that equally plausible
assumptions yield conﬂicting conclusions regarding the optimal rate of inﬂation. Similarly, recent empirical
investigations suggest a lack of consensus. Cross-country studies conrm the cost of high average inﬂation on
growth but nd no robust evidence at low levels of inﬂation. (See Sarel, 1996, and Clark, 1997.) Judson and
Orphanides (1999) nd that the volatility rather than the level of inﬂation may be detrimental to growth at
low levels of inﬂation. Feldstein (1997) identies substantial benets from zero inﬂation due to ineciencies
in the tax code. Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996), however, estimate large costs due to downward wage
rigidities.
3The argument has its roots in Hicks's (1937) interpretation of the Keynesian liquidity trap. Hicks (1967)
identied the question regarding \the eectiveness of monetary policy in engineering recovery from a slump"
as the key short-run concern arising from the trap (p. 57).
1the greater the variability of the nominal interest rate. In this context, \inﬂation greases
the wheels of monetary policy," as Fischer (1996) points out (p. 19). The experience of
the Japanese economy that has been at the zero bound over the past several years and the
uncomfortable resemblance of this experience to the U.S. economy during the 1930s serve
as evidence that the zero bound presents a challenge of signicant practical importance.
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a systematic empirical evaluation of the zero
bound constraint in a stochastic environment and assess the quantitative importance of this
constraint for the performance of alternative monetary policy rules. Recent quantitative
evaluations of policy rules suggest that rules that are very eective in stabilizing output
and inﬂation do indeed entail substantial variability in the short-term nominal interest rate.
(See Taylor, 1999.) Most often, however, the simulated models are linear and neutral to
the average rate of inﬂation and abstract from the zero bound. Alternative policy rules are
then evaluated based on their performance in terms of the variability of output and inﬂation
they induce in such models. This approach to policy evaluation is appropriate with a high
average rate of inﬂation when the non-negativity constraint on nominal interest rates would
be unlikely to bind. However, since policy is not only concerned with stabilizing output and
inﬂation but also with maintaining a low average inﬂation rate, evaluation of the impact of
the zero bound on economic performance is important. To the extent that both inﬂation
and deﬂation hamper economic performance and are otherwise equally undesirable, the
zero bound constraint eectively renders the risks of deviating from an inﬂation rate of zero
asymmetric. As Chairman Greenspan noted recently, \... deﬂation can be detrimental for
reasons that go beyond those that are also associated with inﬂation. Nominal interest rates
are bounded at zero, hence deﬂation raises the possibility of potentially signicant increases
in real interest rates." (From Problems of Price Measurement, remarks at the Annual
Meeting of the American Economic Association and the American Finance Association,
Chicago, Illinois, Jan 3, 1998.)
Eorts to evaluate the quantitative importance of the zero bound have been hampered
by the nonlinearity it introduces a nonlinearity in otherwise linear models. In the context
2of policy rule evaluations, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) indirectly address the
constraint by penalizing policies resulting in exceedingly variable nominal interest rates.
They show that such constrained optimal policies signicantly dier from the optimal rules
that ignore the constraint. A rst assessment of the eect of the zero bound that explicitly
introduces this nonlinearity in a small linear model is provided by Fuhrer and Madigan
(1997). Their results, based on a set of deterministic simulations, suggest that the reduced
policy eectiveness at low inﬂation rates may have a modest eect on output in recessions.
In this paper we estimate a small rational expectations macroeconomic model of the U.S.
economy in which monetary policy has temporary real eects due to sluggish adjustment
in wages and prices. We then compare the stochastic properties of the economy in the
presence of the zero bound on nominal interest rates when monetary policy is set according
to an interest rate rule estimated over the 1990s but with alternative long-run inﬂation
targets. We nd that if the economy is subject to stochastic shocks similar in magnitude
to those experienced in the U.S. over the 1980s and 1990s, the consequences of the zero
bound constraint are negligible for target inﬂation rates as low as 2 percent. However,
the eects of the constraint are non-linear with respect to the inﬂation target and become
increasingly important for determining the eectiveness of policy with inﬂation targets
between 0 and 1 percent. We nd that economic performance deteriorates signicantly
with such low inﬂation targets. The variability of output increases noticeably, while the
variability of inﬂation also rises somewhat. The stationary distribution of output is distorted
with recessions becoming somewhat more frequent and longer lasting. Moreover, in our
model the asymmetry of policy ineectiveness induced by the zero bound generates a non-
vertical long-run Phillips curve. Output falls increasingly short of potential, on average, as
the inﬂation target, and therefore the average rate of inﬂation, becomes smaller. At zero
average inﬂation, the output loss is in the order of 0.1 percent of potential output.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses interest rate
rules and the role of money in the presence of the zero bound on nominal interest rates.
Our estimated model of the U.S. economy is presented in section 3. Section 4 assesses
3the quantitative importance of the zero bound for stabilization policy based on stochastic
simulation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Monetary policy, money demand and the zero bound
Under normal circumstances, that is when the short-term nominal interest rate is not con-
strained at zero, monetary policy can be broadly characterized in terms of a Taylor-style
interest rate rule. We have estimated a generalized form of such a policy rule for the United
States over the 1980:Q1 to 1999:Q4 period, a period over which the zero bound has not
constrained policy in any way (standard errors in parentheses):
it = − :0015
(:0028)
+ :733
(:062)
it−1 + :581
(:107)

(4)
t +1 :038
(:239)
yt − :852
(:223)
yt−1 + i;t: (1)
Here, it is the short-term interest rate, 
(4)
t reﬂects the rate of change of the chain-weighted
GDP deﬂator over four quarters ending in quarter t and yt the output gap, based on the
Congressional Budget Oce (2002) estimate of potential output.
The estimated slope parameters in this policy rule capture the pattern of stabilization
policy during the 1980s and 1990s. The estimated intercept (virtually zero) reﬂects the
central bank's implicit inﬂation target, , and equilibrium real interest rate, r,o v e rt h i s
period. In particular, the policy rule may be rewritten as:
it =( 1 − :733)(r + )+:733it−1 + :581(
(4)
t − )+1 :038yt − :852yt−1 + i;t (10)
with the implicit relationship, 0 = (1 − :733)(r + ) − :581, connecting these concepts.
For example, the estimation suggests an implicit inﬂation target of 1.7 percent over this
period, assuming a value of 2 percent for r.
In this description of policy, the money supply is hidden in the background. As long as
the short-term interest rate is not constrained by the zero bound, the central bank can be
viewed as providing liquidity as needed to achieve the desired interest rate prescribed by the
interest rate rule (1). The appropriate quantity of the monetary base required for this can
be determined from the relevant money demand equation. The details of that specication
4are not important for modeling policy if the monetary transmission channel can be described
in terms of interest rates, as is usually the case in macroeconometric models used for policy
analysis. To illustrate this point dene the inverse of the GDP velocity of the monetary
base (the Marshallian K), Kt = Mt=PtQt,w h e r eMt is the monetary base, Qt is real GDP
and Pt the GDP deﬂator, and consider the simple money demand relation (for the log of
Kt, kt):
it − i = −(kt − k)+k;t:
Here i = r+ and k denote the corresponding equilibrium levels that would obtain if the
economy were to settle down to the policymaker's inﬂation target ,a n dk;t summarizes
other short-term inﬂuences to the demand for money.
Although this equation may usefully summarize the relation between money and interest
rates when the short rate is above zero, once the zero bound is reached further injections of
liquidity are no longer reﬂected in the short-term interest rate. Simply, market participants
need not accept negative interest rates as currency can always serve as an alternative asset
with a zero rate. A complete description of interest rates ought to reﬂect the zero bound
constraint:
it =[i − (kt − k)+k;t]+; (2)
where the function []+ imposes the bound. Figure 1 illustrates the resulting non-linearity
in the relationship between the monetary base and the short-term interest rate by drawing
on the historical experience of the United States in the 1930s and in Japan in the 1990s.
The gure shows annual data for the three-month interest rate and the Marshallian K of
the monetary for each country. As can be seen, the usual downward relationship between
the Marshallian K and the short-term interest rate evident under normal circumstances (in
each case this reﬂects the early years of the sample) was distorted at the zero bound.
Similarly, characterizations of monetary policy with the interest rate rule (1) or (10)
must account for the zero bound in stochastic policy evaluation experiments. In particular,
in an economy that is otherwise neutral to the policymaker's choice of a long-run inﬂation
5Figure 1: Monetary Base and the Zero Interest Rate Bound
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target, , that choice inﬂuences the interest-rate easing buer available for countercyclical
policy i = r +  and is therefore a determining factor of the extent to which the zero
bound inﬂuences stabilization performance. Examining the performance of the economy
for alternative values of  when policy follows a rule such as (10), with an imposed zero
bound, provides a benchmark for assessing the quantitative implications of the zero bound
for stabilization policy. In what follows, we perform this exercise with a model designed to
describe the U.S. economy over the 1980s and 1990s.
3 An empirical model of the U.S. economy
The small open economy model that we use as a laboratory for assessing the eective-
ness of monetary policy when the nominal interest rate is constrained at zero incorporates
forward-looking behavior by economic agents in labor markets, nancial markets and goods
6markets.4 Expectations of endogenous variables are formed rationally and fully reﬂect the
choice of monetary policy rule. Monetary policy, however, still has temporary real eects
due to the presence of staggered wage contracts which induce nominal rigidity. The policy
instrument (the nominal short-term interest rate) is set according to the estimated rule (10)
presented in the preceding section. Due to the presence of nominal rigidity, monetary policy
aects the real interest rate and the real exchange rate, which in turn aect the various
components of aggregate demand. Deviations of aggregate demand from potential output
then have consequences for wage and price setting.
The model equations are summarized in Table 1. First, the long-term nominal rate,
lt, is related to expected future short-term rates via the term structure relationship in
equation (3).5 Then, the long-term real interest rate, rt, is determined according to the
Fisher equation (4), where pt refers to the price level. The real exchange rate, st, depends on
the dierential between domestic and foreign real interest rates consistent with uncovered
interest rate parity (5). The tilde ` ~ ' refers to foreign variables.
Aggregate demand is broken down into its major components: aggregate consumption,
xed investment, inventory investment, total (federal, state and local) government purchases
and net exports, as indicated by equation (6). We scale each demand component by the
level of potential output as estimated by the Congressional Budget Oce (2002), and denote
the result with lower-case letters. Normalized consumption, ct, is modeled as a function
of its own lagged value, permanent income and the expected long-term real interest rate
in equation (7). The lagged dependent variable can be rationalized as reﬂecting habit
persistence. Permanent income,  yt, is modeled as the annuity value of expected income in
the current and next eight periods. Fixed investment, ft, depends on three lags of itself,
4Earlier versions of this model where used in Orphanides, Small, Wieland and Wilcox (1997) as well as
Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999, 2003). The model specication is broadly similar to Taylor (1993).
5Rather than estimating the term structure explicitly, we rely on the accumulated forecasts of the short
rate over the following 8 quarters which, under the expectations hypothesis, will coincide with the long rate
forecast for this horizon. In dening the long rate in terms of the expectations hypothesis we deliberately
avoid the added complexities that would be associated with modeling term and risk premia. Since our
specication is invariant to the presence of a constant premium, we set it equal to zero for expositional
simplicity.
7Table 1: Model Equations
Interest and Exchange Rates
Long-Term Nominal Rate lt =E t
h
1
8
P8
j=1 it+j−1
i
(3)
Long-Term Real Rate rt = lt − 4E t

1
8 (pt+8 − pt)

(4)
Real Exchange Rate st =E t [st+1]+0 :25 (it − 4E t [pt+1 − pt])
−0:25
 ~ it − 4E t [~ pt+1 − ~ pt]

(5)
Aggregate Demand Components
Aggregate Demand yt = ct + ft + nt + et + gt − 1( 6 )
Consumption ct = 1 ct−1 + 2  yt + 3 rt + c;t,( 7 )
where  yt =
(1−:9)
1−(:9)9
P8
i=0(:9)iyt+i
Fixed Investment ft =
P2
i=1 i ft−i + 3  yt + 4 rt + f;t (8)
Inventory Investment nt =
P3
i=1 γi nt−i +
P3
i=1 γ3+i yt−i−1 + n;t (9)
Net Exports et = 1et−1 + 2yt + 3y
t + 4st + e;t (10)
Government Spending gt = gt−1 + g;t (11)
Prices and Wages
Price Level pt =
P3
i=0 !i xt−i, (12)
where !i  0, !i  !i+1 and
P3
i=0 !i =1
Contract Wage xt =E t
hP3
i=0 !i vt+i + 
P3
i=0 !i yt+i
i
+ x;t, (13)
where vt =
P3
i=0 !i (xt−i − pt−i)
Notes: l: long-term nominal interest rate; i : short-term nominal interest rate; r: ex-ante long-term real
interest rate; p: aggregate price level; s: real exchange rate; y: output gap; c: consumption;  y: permanent
income; f: xed investment; n: inventory investment; e: net exports; g: government spending; x: nominal
contract wage; v: real contract wage index; (): random white-noise shocks; the tilde ` ~ ' indicates foreign
variables.
8permanent income as a measure of expected future sales, and the real interest rate (equation
(8)), while inventory investment, nt, instead is (nearly) of the accelerator type (equation
(9)). Net exports, et, depend on the level of income at home and abroad, and on the (trade-
weighted) real exchange rate (equation (10)). Finally, government spending, gt, follows a
simple autoregressive process with a near-unit root (equation (11)). (Random white noise
shocks are denoted by :;t).
As to the short-run supply-side of the model we follow Fuhrer and Moore (1995a,b)
rather than Taylor (1980) in modeling staggered wages and prices. Fuhrer and Moore
assume that workers and rms set the real wage in the rst period of each new contract
with an eye toward the real wage agreed upon in contracts signed in the recent past and
expected to be signed in the near future.6 As they show, models specied in this manner
exhibit a greater (and hence more realistic) degree of inﬂation persistence than do models
in which workers and rms care about relative wages in nominal terms. Equation (12)
indicates that the price level is related to the weighted average of wages on contracts that
are currently in eect assuming a constant markup. Equation (13) species that the real
wage under contracts signed in the current period, xt − pt, is set in reference to a centered
moving average of initial-period real wages established under contracts signed as many as
three quarters earlier as well as contracts to be signed as many as three quarters ahead.
Furthermore, the negotiated real wage is assumed to depend also on expected excess-demand
conditions. The maximum contract length is four quarters.
In the deterministic steady state of this model output is at potential and the sectoral
allocation of GDP is constant for a given combination of equilibrium real interest and
exchange rates. The steady-state value of inﬂation is determined exclusively by the inﬂation
target and the policy rule, because the wage-price block does not impose any restriction on
the steady-state inﬂation rate.
Model estimation. The model allows for inﬂation and output persistence. While the
6By contrast, Taylor assumed that workers and rms set the nominal wage in the rst period of each
new contract with an eye toward the nominal wage settlements of recently signed and soon-to-be signed
contracts.
9presence of these lags is not explicitly derived from optimizing behavior of representative
agents they are consistent with the presence of habit persistence in consumption, adjust-
ment costs in investment and overlapping wage contracts. The advantage of such a model is
that it can t empirical inﬂation and output dynamics for the U.S. economy up to a set of
white-noise structural shocks.7 The demand side equations are estimated on an equation-
by-equation basis using instrumental variables. As to the supply side, we follow Fuhrer
and Moore (1995a,b) and use price data in estimation. We estimate the parameters of the
wage-price block by simulation-based indirect inference methods so as to t the empirical
output and inﬂation dynamics as summarized by an atheoretical VAR model.8 The individ-
ual equations t the data well. In addition we have evaluated the overall t of the complete
model. The series of historical structural shocks computed under model-consistent expecta-
tions show no remaining serial correlation. Furthermore, the degree of inﬂation and output
persistence implied by the model ts the observed degree of persistence as summarized by
an unconstrained VAR model. Individual parameter estimates and evidence regarding the
empirical t of the model are presented in the appendix.
Global stability and scal policy. The zero bound constraint is the only eective nonlin-
earity in the model. However, when it is introduced, the global stability of our otherwise
linear system is no longer ensured. Once shocks to aggregate demand or supply push the
economy into a suciently deep deﬂation, a zero-interest-rate policy may not be able to
return the economy to the original equilibrium. With a series of shocks large enough to
sustain deﬂationary expectations and to keep the real interest rate above its equilibrium
level, aggregate demand is suppressed further sending the economy into a deﬂationary spi-
ral. This points to a limitation inherent in linear models such as this which rely on the real
7An alternative approach following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) is to estimate a model with opti-
mizing agents and achieving empirical t by introducing ad-hoc serially correlated shocks as criticized by
Estrella and Fuhrer (2000). In both cases, the degree of output and inﬂation persistence is important for
the analysis of monetary policy.
8For a more detailed discussion of this estimation methodology see Coenen and Wieland (2000). We
investigated both Taylor's (1980) as well as Fuhrer and Moore's (1995) specication. Our ndings conrmed
the earlier results of Fuhrer and Moore, who showed that under the assumption of rational expectations and
perfect credibility of monetary policy Taylor's specication does not induce sucient inﬂation persistence
to match U.S. data.
10interest rate as the sole channel for monetary policy and also brings into focus the extreme
limiting argument regarding the ineectiveness of monetary policy in a liquidity trap.
To ensure global stability in the presence of the zero-bound constraint, we introduce
a second nonlinearity. We specify a scal policy that, if deﬂation becomes so severe that
the zero bound restricts the real interest rate at a level high enough to induce a growing
aggregate demand imbalance, boosts aggregate demand to rescue the economy from falling
into a deﬂationary spiral.9
4 The quantitative importance of the zero bound
To evaluate whether the zero bound on nominal interest rates would be of quantitative
signicance in practice, it is necessary to assess how frequently monetary policy would
be expected to be constrained if the economy were subjected to stochastic shocks with
properties similar to those we anticipate to obtain in practice. To this end, we employ
stochastic simulations of our model economy. As a baseline, we assume the economy is
subject to shocks drawn from a joint normal distribution with the covariance of the shocks
we estimated for the 1980s and 1990s.10 With these simulations we construct the stationary
distribution of interest rates, inﬂation and output and investigate the extent to which their
statistical properties are altered when the policymaker adopts alternative values of the
inﬂation target, , in the estimated policy rule (10). In particular, we examine the inﬂuence
of the inﬂation target on the means and variances of inﬂation and output, which would be
central for welfare analysis based on a quadratic loss function. The equilibrium real interest
rate r will be maintained at 2 percent.11
9The extent of scal impetus is related to the deviation of the actual federal funds rate, it, (which cannot
be negative), from the notional rate, i
n
t , that would be prescribed by the estimated interest rate rule in the
absence of the zero bound. The scal impetus comes into play with a half-year delay and responds only
to a moving average of of negative deviations of the prescribed interest rate from zero. To ensure scal
consolidation in the long-run, we also restrain government expenditure in a symmetric fashion whenever the
economy experiences very favorable economic conditions, that is, in a situation when output is so far above
potential that the interest rate rule prescribes a rate of more than twice the steady-state value.
10The derivation of historical shocks and the solution methodology are discussed in the appendix.
11Nevertheless, it is straightforward to assess the eect of alternative values of r
. The zero bound regards
the nominal interest rate which in deterministic steady state equals the sum of r
 and 
. Thus, changes in
one parameter can be oset by changes in the other. For example, our results for 
 equal to 1 percent with
11Figure 2: Distortion of Stationary Distribution of Nominal Interest Rate
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Figure 2 shows the impact of the inﬂation target on the distribution of the nominal
interest rate. The top panel shows the frequency with which the zero bound constrains
monetary policy, that is the frequency with which the monetary authority would have set
the nominal rate below zero if that were feasible in that period. As can be seen, the zero
bound does not represent a quantitatively important factor at inﬂation targets at or above
two percent. The constraint becomes binding with about one-tenth frequency only for
targets close to or below one percent. However, this frequency increases to 20 percent as
our baseline assumption of r
 equal to 2 percent also describe the outcome in an economy with r
 equal to
1 percent and 
 equal to 2 percent.
12the inﬂation target drops towards zero.
The bottom panels of Figure 2 describe the resulting distortion of the stationary dis-
tributions of the nominal interest rate. The bottom left panel shows the distortion in the
average level of the nominal interest rate. This is computed as the mean of the stationary
distribution of the short nominal interest rate, it,m i n u sr + , which corresponds to the
mean nominal rate in the absence of the constraint. This property is indeed conrmed in
the gure with the constraint in place when the inﬂation target is large enough for the bind
to occur very infrequently. With inﬂation targets near zero, however, the asymmetric na-
ture of the constraint on policy introduces a signicant bias. Since the constraint provides
a lower bound on the nominal interest rate, it eectively forces policy to be tighter than it
would be in the absence of the constraint under some circumstances. Since no comparable
upper bound is in place, policy is tighter on average. This bias increases with the frequency
with which the constraint binds. As can be seen from the gure, a policymaker following
the estimated rule with a zero inﬂation target would set the nominal interest rate about
50 basis points higher, on average, than if the zero-bound constraint were not in place.
Furthermore, since this constraint restricts the variability of interest rates, the standard
deviation of the interest rate falls somewhat as the inﬂation target drops to zero as shown
in the bottom-right panel of Figure 2.
The distortions of the distribution of nominal interest rates translate into distortions
of the stationary distributions of output and inﬂation. Compared to the unconstrained
case, in which the distributions would be normal, the left tails of the output and inﬂation
distributions will be noticeably thicker. When either output or inﬂation fall considerably
below their means, policy without the constraint would engineer an easing in order to return
output to potential and inﬂation to its target level. With the constraint binding, this is no
longer feasible and consequently reﬂation of the economy occurs at a slower pace. Summary
information regarding the distortion of the distributions of output and inﬂation with the
inﬂation target is shown in Figure 3. The top panel shows the resulting bias in the means
of output and inﬂation and the bottom panel the corresponding changes in the standard
13Figure 3: Distortion of Stationary Distributions of Output and Annual Inﬂation
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deviations. As shown in the upper-right panel, a small downward bias in average inﬂation
(relative to the target) appears as a result of the zero bound. Such a bias is not materially
signicant, however, since a small adjustment to the inﬂation target in the policy rule could
yield any desired average level of inﬂation. A more signicant bias materializes with respect
to the output gap. As the inﬂation target drops to zero, output fails to reach potential, on
average, resulting in a negative average output gap. For a zero inﬂation target the average
output loss is a little below one tenth of a percent. As the bottom panels of the gure
suggest, the variability of output and inﬂation also increases at near zero inﬂation targets.
14Figure 4: Implicit Long-Run Phillips Curve
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The presence of the zero-bound constraint in our model clearly invalidates the long-run
superneutrality that obtains in a linear version of the model. The relationship between
the average level of output and the average level of inﬂation that is due to the zero bound
implies the existence of a long-run Phillips curve. This is shown in Figure 4 which plots
the upward sloping relationship between average inﬂation and average output.12 To note,
the slope of the long run Phillips curve generated by the zero-bound constraint is only
noticeable at average inﬂation rates below two percent and is fairly small. More important,
perhaps, is the non-linearity in the schedule suggesting a greater loss at the margin for
additional reductions in the inﬂation target as the inﬂation target and average inﬂation fall
towards zero.
The source of this non-neutrality can be directly traced to the interaction between
the policy rule and the forward-looking nature of expectations in our model. As is well
12Employing Okun's law to translate negative output gaps to positive unemployment gaps would generate
a downward sloping long-run Phillips curve in the more traditional inﬂation-unemployment space.
15known, in models with rational expectations such as ours, the sacrice ratio|the ratio of
the cumulative output gap loss (gain) required for a given reduction (rise) in the inﬂation
rate|is a function of the policy responsiveness to inﬂation and output. With a linear policy
reaction function, as is the case when the inﬂation target is suciently high for the zero
bound to be irrelevant, output losses when inﬂation is above the steady state and falls
towards it exactly oset output gains when inﬂation is below the steady state and rising
towards it. The responsiveness of policy to inﬂation and output is the same in both cases.
Symmetry prevails and on average the output gap is zero. This is not the case when the zero
bound becomes important. When the constraint is binding, the responsiveness of policy to
marginal changes in inﬂation is nil|the interest rate is constrained at zero. When the
constraint is not binding, the usual responsiveness of policy is restored. But the former is
more likely when inﬂation is below its target than above its target so symmetry fails and
a bias in the average output gap appears. It is worth noting that if expectations were of
a backward-looking, adaptive nature, the long-run Phillips curve would be vertical as in
that case the sacrice ratio would be invariant to the policy responsiveness altogether. Of
course, introducing additional non-linearities in policy might oset this bias but it would
also move the policy away from its original unrestricted linear specication and distort the
higher moments of the stationary distributions of inﬂation and output.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis for the United States indicates that if the economy is subject to stochastic
shocks similar in magnitude to those experienced over the 1980s and 1990s, the consequences
of the zero bound are negligible for target inﬂation rates as low as 2 percent. However, the
eects of the constraint become increasingly important for determining the eectiveness of
policy with inﬂation targets between 0 and 1 percent. Although these results are suggestive,
it is important to recognize that some uncertainty remains regarding the magnitude of the
distortions introduced by the zero bound when targeting zero inﬂation. For example, since
our model was estimated for the 1980s and 1990s, a relatively calm period for the U.S.
16economy, the variances of demand and supply shocks may be smaller than in earlier periods.
Larger disturbances will render the zero bound more important. Similarly, the assumption
that policymakers observe the data and the relevant model parameters without error may
lead us to underestimate the impact of the zero bound. Recognition of data uncertainty
(see for example Orphanides (2001) or parameter uncertainty (see for example Wieland
(1998)) would raise the importance of the zero bound as a constraint on monetary policy in
practice. However, our estimate would be reduced to the extent that channels of monetary
policy transmission other than the interest or exchange rate channel would remain eective
important when the zero bound renders the interest rate channel ineectual. Similarly,
policy outcomes might be improved if a non-linear policy rule for the interest rate or for the
exchange rate designed to explicitly reduce the distortions resulting from the zero bound
were followed.
In summary, our results point to a fundamental diculty associated with the evaluation
of stabilization policies with a price stability objective based on simple linear models. The
presence of the zero bound constraint invalidates the underlying superneutrality properties
of otherwise linear models. At low rates of inﬂation, the zero bound distorts the stochastic
properties of the economy and induces a tradeo between the average level of inﬂation and
the variability of inﬂation and output. As a result, the optimal average rate of inﬂation
cannot be investigated independently of the variability of output and inﬂation. Since our
results suggest that deﬂation potentially engenders greater dangers than inﬂation, it may
be optimal to pursue a price stability objective that allows for a small but positive bias in
the average rate of inﬂation. The optimal size of such a bias, however, remains an open
question. Furthermore, the optimal policy rule in the presence of the zero bound on nominal
interest rates is likely to be nonlinear and asymmetric in a low or zero inﬂation environment.
Characterizing the optimal rule represents an important issue for future research.
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20Appendix: Estimation results and simulation techniques
The parameter estimates of our model are summarized in Table A-1.
Table A-1: Parameter Estimates
Consumption (a) 1 2 3
0.642 0.304 -0.062
(0.045) (0.038) (0.015)
Fixed Investment (a) 1 2 3 4
1.383 -0.408 0.030 -0.019
(0.049) (0.053) (0.015) (0.014)
Inventory Investment (a) γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6
0.350 0.072 0.129 0.315 -0.084 -0.188
(0.058) (0.041) (0.078) (0.050) (0.073) (0.035)
Net Exports (a) 1 2 3 4
0.907 -0.027 0.056 -0.006
(0.040) (0.019) (0.011) (0.002)
Government Spending (a) 
0.956
(0.024)
Fuhrer-Moore Contracts (b) !0 !1 !2 !3 
0.451 0.302 0.1237 0.1237 0.003
(0.054) (0.016) (0.0015)
Notes:
(a) Instrumental variables estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample period: 1980:Q1 to
1999:Q4.
(b) Simulation-based indirect estimates using a VAR(3) model of quarterly inﬂation and the
output gap as auxiliary model. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample period: 1965:Q1 to 2001:Q4
extending Fuhrer and Moore (1995).
21In preparation for the stochastic simulations, we rst computed the structural shocks
of the model based on U.S. data from 1980 to 1999.13 Since the non-negativity constraint
for nominal interest rates was never binding during this period and our model is otherwise
linear, we obtained the structural shocks by solving the model analytically for the reduced
form using the AIM implementation (Anderson and Moore, 1985, and Anderson, 1997) of
the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) method for solving linear rational expectations models.
The structural shocks also provide a good indication of the historical t of our model.
Figure A-1 shows the correlogram of historical structural shocks, which overall reveals no
signicant serial correlation.
A further indication of the good empirical t of our model is obtained from a com-
parison of the implied autocorrelation functions of inﬂation and output with the empirical
autocorrelation functions implied by an unconstrained bivariate VAR.14 The comparison of
autocorrelation functions of inﬂation and output in the U.S. economy is reported in Figure
A-2. The solid lines refer to the autocorrelation functions implied by the model. The thin
dotted lines in each panel correspond to the asymptotic 95% condence bands associated
with the autocorrelation functions of the bivariate unconstrained VAR(3) model used in the
estimation of the staggered contracts specications.15
Based on the covariance matrix of structural historical shocks, we generated 100 sets
of articial normally-distributed shocks with 100 quarters of shocks in each set from which
the rst 20 twenty quarters of shocks were discarded in order to guarantee that the eect
of the initial values die out. We then used the sets of retained shocks to conduct stochastic
simulations under alternative inﬂation targets, while imposing the non-negativity constraint
on nominal interest rates.16
We simulate the model using an ecient algorithm implemented in TROLL and based
on work by Boucekkine (1995), Juillard (1994) and Laargue (1990). It is related to the
Fair-Taylor (1983) extended path algorithm. A limitation of the algorithm is that the
model-consistent expectations of market participants are computed under the counterfactual
13The process of calculating the structural shocks would be straightforward if the model in question were
a purely backward-looking model. For a rational expectations model, however, structural shocks can be
computed only by simulating the full model and computing the time series of model-consistent expectations
with respect to historical data. The structural shocks dier from the estimated residuals to the extent of
agents' forecast errors.
14Such an approach has also been used by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) who argued that autocorrelation
functions are more appropriate for confronting macroeconomic models with the data than impulse response
functions because of their purely descriptive nature.
15For a detailed discussion of the methodology and the derivation of the asymptotic condence bands for
the estimated autocorrelation functions the reader is referred to Coenen (2000).
16If it were not for this nonlinearity, we could use the reduced form of the model corresponding to the
alternative policy rules to compute unconditional moments of the endogenous variables without having to
resort to stochastic simulations.
22Figure A-1: Correlation Pattern of Historical Structural Shocks
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Notes: Solid bars: Autocorrelation functions implied by the estimated model of the U.S. economy. Dotted
lines: Asymptotic 95%-condence bands.
assumption that `certainty equivalence' holds in the nonlinear model being simulated. This
means, when solving for the dynamic path of the endogenous variables from a given period
onwards, the algorithm sets future shocks equal to their expected value of zero. Thus
the variance of future shocks has no bearing on the formation of current expectations
and economic performance. This would be correct in a linear model. However once we
introduce the zero bound on nominal interest rates into the model, we are able to show that
the variance of future shocks ought to be expected to introduce a small bias in the average
levels of various variables, including importantly, interest rates. This result is discussed
23Figure A-2: Fitting Inﬂation and Output Dynamics with the Structural Model
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the output gap.
in detail in section 4 of this paper. To be clear, we should emphasize that the variance
of shocks has both a direct and an indirect eect on the results. The direct eect is that
a greater variance of shocks implies that the zero bound on nominal interest rates binds
with greater frequency, the indirect eect is that all agents should be taking this eect of
the variance into account when they form their expectations. The simulation algorithm
captures the direct eect but not the indirect one.
There are other solution algorithms for nonlinear rational expectations models that do
24not impose certainty equivalence. But these alternative algorithms would be prohibitively
costly to use with our model, which has more than twenty state variables. Even with the
algorithm we are using, stochastic analysis of nonlinear rational expectations models with
a moderate number of state variables remains fairly costly in terms of computational eort.
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